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YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
I. THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF 
YOUNGSTOWN 
In the spring of 2001-before the war came-the student 
editors of the Minnesota Law Review were casting about ideas 
for a symposium topic for 2002. I suggested an issue commemo-
rating the fiftieth anniversary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer/ the famous "Steel Seizure Case" decided by the Su-
preme Court on June 2, 1952. A quizzical e-mail came back, 
asking, "Why does Youngstown matter? Where is it taking us?" 
I laughed sadly, not quite sure whether to be disappointed 
at the student editors' ignorance of Youngstown's historical and 
ongoing significance, angry at their constitutional law professors' 
failure to communicate that significance to them, or simply 
amused as the naivete and short-term perspective of second-year 
law students looking for immediate "hot topic" relevance at a 
time when constitutional issues of foreign policy, war powers, 
national security, and separation of powers were not foremost in 
people's minds. 
A lot has changed since then. In the world after September 
11, 2001, there can no longer be any doubt: Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer is one of the most significant Supreme Court 
decisions of all time. The decision resolved a major constitu-
tional crisis, and it did so during time of war and at a crucial 
juncture in the nation's political history. It resolved the crisis 
correctly, with both immediate and long-term important effect. 
Youngstown's holding-that the President of the United States 
possesses no inherent, unilateral legislative power in time of war 
or emergency-and equally so the analysis the Court's majority 
and principal concurring opinions have proven enduringly rele-
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vant to nearly every constitutional issue of war and peace, for-
eign policy, domestic legislative power, presidential power, and 
even judicial power that has confronted the United States in the 
past fifty years. Youngstown is one of the truly "great" cases-in 
every sense of the word- in the American constitutional law 
canon. 
Consider for a moment what the decision did: Youngstown 
holds that the President, as chief executive, may not "execute" 
laws of his own making: the President of the United States may 
not constitutionally legislate on his own authority, ever. The 
President is not a legislator except in the limited capacities in 
which Article I and Article II authorize his participation in the 
legislative process via the veto, the discretion to recommend 
measures, and the power to adjourn Congress in case of dis-
agreement between the two houses with respect to the time of 
adjournment. He may not enact domestic legislation unilater-
ally, by executive decree, but may only carry into effect enact-
ments of the legislature or execute his own constitutional pow-
ers-which pointedly do not include any general legislative 
powers. And this remains true even in the case of war or na-
tional emergency. 
This is a huge constitutional principle, and one that is abso-
lutely foundational to American constitutional government. It is 
a principle that seems perfectly obvious today. But it was one 
that was at some risk in the immediate post-World War II era, in 
the aftermath of the rise of the New Deal's "administrative 
state" and in the dawn of the incipient "national security state" 
created by nuclear weaponry and the Cold War. Youngstown 
strangled, at a crucial moment in our nation's history, the shock-
ing assertion- and this was precisely President Harry S Tru-
man's assertion-that the President possesses inherent domestic 
legislative power during time of (unauthorized) war initiated by 
the President. Had Youngstown gone the other way- had it 
gone wrong and Truman's claim of unilateral presidential legisla-
tive power prevailed-we would be living under a significantly 
different, more dangerous, constitutional regime than the one we 
have today. 
Further, Youngstown holds, by necessary implication, that 
the President is not and cannot be the sole judge of the scope of 
his own constitutional and statutory powers. The Supreme 
Court can and will (sometimes) rule on such constitutional ques-
tions. And it can and will (sometimes) rule against the President 
of the United States, even in times of war or national emergency. 
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This significant and seemingly obvious point is obvious today 
only because Youngstown was in fact decided by the Supreme 
Court fifty years ago, because of the way in which it was decided 
(against President Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills), 
and because Truman acquiesced in the Court's ruling. Thus, the 
judiciary's view prevailed in a major constitutional confrontation 
with the President of the United States concerning the scope of 
presidential power. 
None of this was at all obvious or inevitable in 1952. In-
deed, each of these features of Youngstown is rather remarkable. 
Youngstown showed that the judiciary will not (necessarily) ab-
stain from decision of constitutional questions concerning the 
scope of the President's constitutional powers, even in matters 
touching on war, foreign affairs, national security, and national 
emergency. This is a principle of tremendous significance, even 
though it has been compromised and abandoned-sporadically, 
selectively, and inconsistently-over the course of the past half-
century, through the vehicle of the Court's "political question" 
doctrine. 
The fact that the Court was willing, arguably for the first 
time in our Nation's history, not only to issue a ruling on the 
merits but to rule against the President of the United States on a 
question of the scope of the President's constitutional powers 
makes Youngstown of singular importance. Youngstown is to 
executive power what Marbury v. Madison2 is to legislative 
power, only more so. Marbury was, at most, a weak assertion of 
judicial power over the legislature, and not at all an assertion of 
judicial supremacy over the other branches of the federal gov-
ernment.3 The Court in Marbury pointedly refrained from as-
serting any general constitutional control of executive actions,4 
asserting (but not actually exerting) authority over executive 
branch officials only in the most limited context of non-
discretionary "ministerial" actions.5 Youngstown, in contrast, is 
a bold assertion of judicial power over the conduct of the Presi-
dent in matters concerning the scope of the President's constitu-
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
3. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 241-45, 257-62 (1994); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 
Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1349-59 (1999). 
4. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (explicitly denying the existence of judicial 
power to "intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive"). 
5. Marbury, 5 U.S. {1 Cranch) at 171 (holding that mandamus was proper to com-
pel performance of a purely "ministerial" act). 
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tional authority. It is probably the Supreme Court's first genu-
ine assertion and exercise of the Court's modern claim of consti-
tutional interpretive supremacy over the actions of the Presi-
dent of the United States, in a case where such a claim really 
mattered.6 The claim of judicial supremacy was not made in ex-
press terms, as the Court would come to make it six years later, 
in Cooper v. Aaron, and repeatedly in cases in the five decades 
since Youngstown. 7 Rather, the claim of supremacy in Youngs-
town was implicit in the Court's action: it upheld an injunction 
against the enforcement of the President's orders, nullifying a 
presidential executive order in time of war. 
And the nullification stuck. This is perhaps the most signifi-
cant feature of the case of all. Youngstown is remarkable in that 
President Truman accepted and obeyed the Court's decision, 
even though he apparently disagreed with it quite strongly, es-
tablishing the political precedent of judicial supremacy through 
presidential acquiescence in the Supreme Court's interpretations 
of the Constitution.8 Again, this is a commonplace today. But it 
is a commonplace, I submit, only because of Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer and Truman's acquiescence. No prior Su-
preme Court decision genuinely claimed judicial supremacy over 
6. See Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev at 1339 n.lO (cited in note 3). 
7. See, e.g. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that "the federal judi-
ciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"); Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (referring to the "responsibility of this Court as ultimate inter-
preter of the Constitution"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) ("[I)t is the 
responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (again describing the Court as "ultimate inter-
preter of the Constitution"); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (Court claiming to be "invested with the authority to ... speak 
before all others" on the meaning of the Constitution); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 616 & n. 7 (2000) ("[S)ince Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate ex-
positor of the constitutional text."). 
8. David McCullough, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of Truman, relates 
Truman's incredulity at the district court opinion against him, his statement that he 
would be '"terribly shocked, disappointed and disturbed'" if the Supreme Court were to 
decide against him, and his anger at the ultimate decision. David McCullough, Truman 
900-01 (Simon & Schuster, 1992). McCullough then recounts Justice Hugo Black's fence-
mending invitation of President Truman and the Justices to a party at Black's home in 
Old Town Alexandria. "At the start of the evening, Truman, though polite, seemed 'a 
bit testy,' remembered William 0. Douglas. 'But after the bourbon and canapes were 
passed, he turned to Hugo and said, "Hugo, I don't much care for your law, but, by golly, 
this bourbon is good.""' ld. at 901. 
In his memoirs, former President Truman wrote that "[w)hatever the six justices of 
the Supreme Court meant by their differing opinions, [the President) must always act in a 
national emergency .... The President, who is Commander in Chief and who represents 
the interest of all the people must [be] able to act at all times to meet any sudden threat 
to the nation's security." Harry S. Truman, 2 Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope 478 
(Doubleday, 1956). 
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the President in matters involving interpretation of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers and prerogatives. No prior judicial 
confrontation with the executive resulted in so complete a vic-
tory for the Court.9 
Judicial triumphs tend to beget more judicial triumphs-and 
sometimes judicial triumphalism and hubris. It is probably only 
a slight exaggeration to say that if there had been no Youngs-
town there would have been no Brown v. Board of Education, 10 
no Cooper v. Aaron,11 no Warren Court criminal procedure and 
civil rights revolution, no United States v. Nixon, 12 no Roe v. 
Wade 13 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 14 Still more, had 
Youngstown played out differently in the end- had Truman re-
sisted or evaded the Court's judgment against his seizure of the 
steel industry-the aftermath of the Nixon Tapes case might 
have played out differently, too. Had Truman successfully held 
on to the steel mills in the face of an adverse decision, Nixon 
probably would have held on to the tapes, too, no matter what 
the Court said. And perhaps the Court would not even have 
tried to order Nixon to produce the tapes in the first place. Fi-
nally, if Youngstown had been decided the other way, The Pen-
tagon Papers Case15 probably would have played out differently, 
too. The federal government probably would have won in court 
the power to enjoin a newspaper's publication of materials the 
government deems detrimental to national security (or affir-
mance of an executive order banning such publication).16 Or, 
had Youngstown been decided as it was but Truman successfully 
defied the judgment, Nixon might have seized the printing 
9. In stark contrast, compare Chief Justice Taney's writ of habeas corpus directed 
at President Lincoln, at the outset of the Civil War, in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 
(C.C.D. Md. 1861). Lincoln ignored the writ. For that story, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (1993). 
10. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
II. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
12. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
13. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
14. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
15. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("The Pentagon Pa-
pers Case")-
16. Id. In The Pentagon Papers Case, the Court rejected, 6-3, the government's ap-
plication for an injunction against publication of classified government documents de-
scribing the history of the government's decision-making process with respect to in-
volvement in the war in Vietnam, with several concurring justices (whose votes were 
necessary to the judgment) relying in substantial part on Youngstown. See 403 U.S. at 
740 (White, J., with whom Stewart, J., joins, concurring); id. at 742, 745-46 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
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presses of The New York Times and The Washington Post and 
ignored any judicial decrees to the contrary. 17 
In short, Youngstown in no insubstantial measure accounts 
for the modern reality of judicial supremacy in constitutional in-
terpretation; for presidential, congressional, and popular acqui-
escence to that reality; for the resultant possibility of the results 
in Brown, Nixon, and The Pentagon Papers Case and possibly 
many others; for the fact that presidential war powers remain 
constitutionally limited and that such limitations are, at least in 
substantial part, honored even in an era of nuclear weapons and 
even under conditions of emergency; and for the current domi-
nant paradigm through which most important constitutional 
questions of war, foreign affairs, and separation-of-powers issues 
in general are understood and evaluated by Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the courts. That is a lot to say for one case. 18 
The enduring significance of Youngstown may have been 
underplayed in the years between the denouement of the Cold 
War in (roughly) September 1991 and the beginning of the pre-
sent war almost exactly ten years later, in September 2001. A 
child of the 1990s-and law students at the turn of the twenty-
first century-might be forgiven for not immediately grasping 
why a case about temporary presidential seizure of steel mills 
during the Korean War remains relevant today. (It is a bit 
harder to forgive their constitutional law professors.) In the 
world after September 11, however, it is clear that Youngstown, 
in addition to being one of the most significant constitutional de-
cisions in our nation's history, is also directly and proximately 
relevant to some of the most important constitutional issues con-
fronting the United States government on Youngstown's fiftieth 
anniversary, at a time when our nation is once again at war. 
In the remainder of this essay, I will answer the student edi-
tor's compound question-"Why does Youngstown matter? 
Where is it taking us?" -with specific reference to the world in 
which we find ourselves after September 11, 2001. Specifically, I 
17. David McCullough's biography of President Truman reports that Truman, 
asked at a press conference in advance of the Youngstown decision whether his rationale 
for seizing the steel mills might equally sustain seizing the presses, answered that, 
"(u]nder similar circumstances, the President of the United States has to act for whatever 
is best for the country." Quoted in McCullough, Truman at 900 (cited in note 8). 
18. As Professor Bellia notes in her contribution to this symposium, it is therefore 
quite ironic that Youngstown initially was greeted by confident dismissals of the decision 
as containing shallow analysis unlikely to be of much continuing significance. Patricia L. 
Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 Const. Comm. 87,87-90 (2002). 
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will address Youngstown's relevance to war, and especially to 
presidential power to conduct the present War on Terrorism. 
My thesis is that Youngstown is highly relevant to war pow-
ers, supplying the proper paradigms for applying the Constitu-
tion's overlapping allocations of war power to Congress and the 
President. Both Justice Black's majority opinion and Justice 
Jackson's more celebrated concurrence state sound principles of 
law, completely consistent with each other, that properly guide 
present interpreters in evaluating the Constitution's division of 
powers concerning war and peace. Properly viewed, Youngs-
town creates a paradigm of three-branch constitutional interpre-
tation with respect to these issues, an approach consonant with 
the Constitution's separation-of-powers generally. The scope of 
presidential war power depends on the President's interpretation 
of the scope of his constitutional powers in this area; on Con-
gress's interpretation of the scope of the President's constitu-
tional powers in this area (in addition to its specific delegations 
of power to the President); and on the judiciary's interpretation 
of the scope of the President's and Congress's constitutional 
powers in light of the interpretation of these powers by those 
other branches. 19 
On this view, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (the 
"WPR")20 and the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for Use 
of Military Force" (which I will call "The 9-18-01 Resolution")21 
are critical acts of congressional constitutional interpretation 
with important implications for evaluating the scope of presiden-
tial war power. The War Powers Resolution is in many respects 
a highly contestable congressional constitutional interpretation 
of the scope of presidential war powers in the absence of a decla-
19. In this respect, I believe Youngstown is consistent with a position I have argued 
in greater detail in other writing: that the power of constitutional interpretation is a di-
vided, shared power of all three branches of the federal government, not the sole and 
exclusive province of the courts. See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in note 
3); Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 1337 (cited in note 3). 
20. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555-559, codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994 and Supp. V 1999). 
21. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). The resolution was passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, and signed by 
President Bush on September 18, 2001. Some commentators have referred to this en-
actment as Congress's "September 14 Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force." 
Curtis A Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commis-
sions, 5 Green Bag 249, 252 & n.l8 (2002). Which date is correct turns on whether one 
thinks that congressional legislation authorizing the President to use military force, in-
cluding declarations of war, must comply with Article I section 7's requirement of pre-
sentment to the President. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27,81-86 
(1991). 
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ration of war or functionally-equivalent congressional authoriza-
tion of war. Some features of the War Powers Resolution are 
obviously unconstitutional.22 But in at least one respect the War 
Powers Resolution is plainly legitimate and fits neatly within the 
three-category paradigm established by Justice Jackson's 
Youngstown concurrence.23 The War Powers Resolution estab-
lishes a rule of construction concerning congressional action and 
inaction that effectively excludes what I will call, borrowing from 
Justice Jackson's taxonomy, "Category II wars" -that is, wars 
that might otherwise be thought legally justified by implicit 
presidential war-making authority resulting from "congressional 
inertia, indifference, or quiescence."24 The War Powers Resolu-
tion says, almost in so many words, that insofar as legitimate 
presidential war-making power might be thought to depend on 
an inference from congressional action or inaction, Congress has 
adopted a standing statutory rule specifically repudiating any 
such inference. As far as Congress is concerned, there are to be 
no more "Category II wars" thought to be impliedly authorized 
by treaty provisions, appropriations acts, or any other legislative 
action (or inaction) short of specific authorization.25 Moreover, 
to the extent the President would interpret the Constitution as 
permitting him to introduce armed forces into combat situations 
on his own authority, Congress's interpretation is that the Con-
stitution does not authorize such unilateral action- and certainly 
not beyond sixty days.26 
In this respect, the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for 
Use of Military Force" constitutes a major paradigm shift-a wa-
tershed constitutional event. While the 9-18-01 Resolution is, in 
form, an authorization purporting to fit within the parameters of 
the War Powers Resolution,27 the Resolution creates very nearly 
22. I discuss the "legislative veto" provisions of the War Powers Resolution below. 
See infra p. 246. 
23. In briefest tenns, Justice Jackson thought presidential power to fluctuate de-
pending on where it falls along a continuum from "Category I" (legislatively authorized 
presidential action) to "Category II" (unclear legislative action in an area of uncertain 
allocation of constitutional power between the President and Congress) to "Category 
III" (legislative denial of authorization to the President, such that the President's action 
is proper only if it lies within the President's constitutional powers that exist independent 
of legislative action). Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). For fur-
ther elaboration of this paradigm, see infra at pp. 224-225. 
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
25. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a). 
26. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541, 1547(a). I discuss below the effect of sections 1542-1546 of 
the War Powers Resolution as creating a de facto "safe harbor" for unilateral presidential 
action. See infra pp. 247-249. 
27. Authorization for Use of Military Force,§ 2(b)(l), 115 Stat. at 224 ("Consistent 
2002] YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR 223 
plenary presidential power to conduct the present war on terror-
ism, through the use of military and other means, against ene-
mies both abroad and possibly even within the borders of the 
United States, as identified by the President, and without appar-
ent limitation as to duration, scope, and tactics. The September 
18 Resolution has both "Youngstown Category I" and "Youngs-
town Category II" elements, and triggers broad presidential con-
stitutional power under both heads. The President is specifically 
authorized (Category I) and delegated power in broad terms to 
use force against persons, nations, or organizations he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed or aided the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, or who harbor such persons or organiza-
tions. That is a sweeping delegation of the war power. More-
over, the Resolution declares, in its final "whereas" clause, that 
"the President has authority under the Constitution to take action 
to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the 
United States."28 This near-unanimous congressional interpreta-
tion of the Constitution29 essentially authorizes the President to 
conduct, in Youngstown terms, a "Category II war" on terrorism 
going beyond even the sweeping terms of the specifically-
authorized "Category I war" against those the President deter-
mines are responsible for, or assisted, the attacks of September 
11, 2001. Indeed, given how sweeping and unequivocal this con-
gressional endorsement of presidential constitutional power is, 
one might well refer to this aspect of the 9-18-01 Resolution as 
recognizing presidential power to wage a "Category I~ War." 
Part II of this essay discusses the majority and principal 
concurring opinions in Youngstown and defends the proposition 
that these opinions can be seen as establishing a consistent para-
digm of three-branch constitutional interpretation in matters of 
war and foreign affairs. Part III then looks at the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 and the 9-18-01 Resolution as different appli-
cations of this paradigm, with important implications for the pre-
sent War on Terrorism and for our understanding of war powers 
generally. 
with section 1547(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this 
section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
section S(b) of the War Powers Resolution."); § 2(b)(2) ("Nothing in this resolution 
supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution."). 
28. Authorization for Use of Military Force,115 Stat. 224 (2001) (emphasis added). 
29. The Senate vote on S.J. Res. 23 (became Pub. L. No. 107-40) was 98-0. Vote 281 
(available at <http://scnate.gov/legislativevote1071/vote-0028l.html> ). The House vote 
on H.J. Res. 64 (became Pub. L. No. 107-40) was 420-1. Vote 342 (available at <http:// 
clerkweb.gov/cgi -bin/vote.exe ?year=2001&rollnumbcr=342>). 
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II. YOUNGSTOWN AS THREE-BRANCH 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Everybody seems to agree that Youngstown established the 
dominant paradigm for evaluating disputes between Congress 
and the President over the scope of their respective constitu-
tional powers. Ironically, though, nobody seems to agree on 
what that paradigm is. 
It has become fashionable for some academic commenta-
tors, and even for the Court itself, to note the eclipse of Justice 
Hugo Black's majority opinion by Justice Robert Jackson's con-
currence, in terms of influence in establishing the governing 
paradigm.30 To be sure, Jackson's concurrence is marvelous. 
The opinion is characteristically lucid, full of the grace and so-
phistication that makes Jackson's writing so persuasive and en-
joyable to read. Its analysis is (in the main) cautious and precise. 
The opinion provides the tremendously influential and useful 
three-category framework that offers a workable and simple, but 
not grossly oversimplified, general approach to separation of 
powers issues involving presidential versus congressional author-
ity. To greatly compress: Under Jackson's analysis, 
"[p ]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, dependinH 
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress" 
and thus fall along a continuum, roughly marked by three broad 
categories of congressional action: "Category I" consists of situa-
tions where Congress has authorized presidential action, trigger-
ing the President's core Article II "executive power" to carry 
into effect legislative action in addition to whatever unilateral, 
independent constitutional powers the President possesses. 
30. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); Nixon v. Adm'r of 
Gen. Serv. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("[T]he unanimous Court [in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974)] essentially embraced Mr. Justice Jackson's view, expressed in his 
concurrence in Youngstown .... "); Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gerald Gunther, Constitu-
tional Law 342 (Foundation Press, 14th ed. 2001) ("Of all the opinions in the Steel Sei-
zure Case, Justice Jackson's has been the most widely relied on in later decisions."); Tara 
L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day 
America, 28 J. Legis. 1, 62 (2002) ("Despite the numerous opinions issued in Youngstown 
upholding the importance of a system of checks and balances, Justice Jackson's concur-
rence may have been the most important .... "); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review & the 
President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1982) ("It is Justice Jackson's fa-
mous concurring opinion in Youngstown that has most influenced subsequent analysis.") 
(citation omitted); Paul Gerwirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 343, 352 ("Today it is almost universally believed that the more narrowly 
framed concurring opinions in that case [Youngstown] capture what it really stands for.") 
See also Bellia, supra note 18 at 89 n. 11. 
31. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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"Category II" consists of situations where the Constitution's al-
location of power between Congress and the President is, as ap-
plied to the situation at hand, uncertain or indeterminate (the 
famous "zone of twilight"32) and where the existence or extent of 
Congress's legislative authorization, approval, or acquiescence 
(to move, progressively, from stronger to weaker claims of legis-
lative action triggering enhanced executive power) is also un-
clear.33 Finally, Jackson's "Category III" consists of situations 
where the President takes action inconsistent with Congress's 
legislative directions (which Jackson expands, less helpfully, to 
legislative actions "expressed or implied"34), in which case the 
President must possess independent constitutional power that 
fully justifies his action irrespective of what Congress says.35 
Justice Jackson's opinion is more comprehensive, possesses 
greater subtly, and has broader explanatory power than does 
Justice Black's majority opinion. But it is a mistake to suggest 
(as some do) that Justice Jackson's concurrence and Justice 
Black's majority opinion are inconsistent with one another. The 
two opinions are perfectly harmonious: Jackson's analytic ap-
proach is right-and so is Black's. 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court is straightforward, di-
rect, and elegant-a masterpiece of textual and formal analysis. 
In its own, different way, it is as great a work of judicial art as 
Jackson's concurrence. It has the simplicity and beauty of ape-
fectly-reasoned four-line proof of some proposition of Euclidian 
geometry: A president's power to act must stem from either an 
act of Congress (the "executive Power") or from his independ-
ent constitutional powers. No congressional act authorized this 
presidential action. Nor could President Truman's order be sus-
tained under any independent presidential power: The military 
power of Commander-in-Chief does not include a power to con-
script private resources; that "is a job for the Nation's lawmak-
ers, not its military authorities."36 The "executive" power is a 
power to carry into execution laws passed by Congress, not a 
freestanding legislative power of the President.37 Past practice to 
the contrary certainly does not alter the Constitution's funda-
32. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 638. 
36. I d. at 587. 
37. Id. at 587-88. 
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mental allocation of powers.38 Nor does a claim of exigency.39 
Black's majority opinion is not quite that short, but it almost 
is. The tone is flat, dry, prosaic. It is elegant but not eloquent. 
It is complete in itself but certainly not a comprehensive treat-
ment of its subject matter. Nowhere to be found is any extended 
discussion of hypothetical situations, exceptions, limitations, 
contingencies, doubtful cases, or broad categories. In this re-
spect, it differs markedly in style from the concurrence of Justice 
Jackson. But it does not differ markedly in substance. Justice 
Jackson's more grand concurrence simply addresses a broader 
range of circumstances implicated by the Court's discussion of 
presidential versus congressional power. But these circum-
stances were not actually presented by the facts of the case be-
fore the Court. 
Interestingly, Justice Black's opinion for the Court can be 
seen as fitting almost perfectly into Jackson's Category I-II-III 
analysis, but without using that terminology-and without falling 
into the small lapses in analytic rigor in Jackson's concurrence 
(and the somewhat more serious lapses in Justice Frank-
furter's).40 When Black writes that "[t]he President's power, if 
any, to issue the order [seizing the steel mills] must stem either 
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,"41 he is 
engaging in category-talk, without the label. There must either 
be legislative authorization for the President's action (Category 
I) or there must be independent presidential power (Category 
III). 
Category II is not excluded either, at least not entirely. 
Rather, for Black, such a category appears to be a subset of the 
broader category of legislative authorization, where authoriza-
tion is implied rather than express: "There is no statute that ex-
pressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as 
he did here," Black's opinion says. But he turns to Category II-
type analysis in the very next sentence: "Nor is there any act of 
Congress ... from which such a power can fairly be implied."42 
This is a quintessential Category II inquiry. Can congressional 
38. Id. at 588 ("Congress has not ... lost its exclusive constitutional authority to 
make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution"). 
39. Id. at 589 ("The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the 
Congress alone in both good and bad times."). 
40. I discuss these presently. See infra pp. 227-228. See also infra at pp. 234-236 
(addressing flaws in Jackson's general approach). 
41. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. 
42. Id. (emphasis added). 
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action-or inaction- be construed as authorization or acquies-
cence sufficient to permit the President to act? Black considers 
this possibility and rejects it on the facts of the case. First, he 
notes the Government's concession that neither the Selective 
Service Act of 1948 nor the Defense Production Act of 1950 jus-
tified the steel seizure. Next, he discusses the fact that the "sei-
zure technique" was "not only unauthorized" but that Congress, 
after considering creating such a power, "refused to adopt that 
method of settling labor disputes" in its enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act. (The concurrences make a bit more of this datum, 
but not to improved effect, as I discuss presently.t3 Black's con-
clusion from congressional consideration and non-enactment of 
a seizure power is straightforward: "[T]he plan Congress 
adopted in that Act did not provide for seizure under any cir-
cumstances."44 In short, Congress's failure to authorize such 
presidential action should be construed as, well, not authorizing 
such presidential action. Thus, Congress had not by legislative 
action created express or "implied" presidential authority. 
This is "Category II" analysis, similar in the topics it ad-
dresses to Justice Jackson's discussion within that category. In-
deed, in certain respects it is better Category II analysis than that 
of the concurring opinions: it is simpler, plainer, and avoids the 
obvious analytic error of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence (in 
which Justice Jackson concurredt5 of treating Congress's con-
sideration of but failure to enact a provision as the equivalent of 
an affirmative statutory prohibition of such action.46 
43. Id. at 586; see infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
44. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586. 
45. Id. at 639 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring) (embracing Justice Frankfurter's concur-
rence on this point). 
46. Id. at 602-603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The authoritatively expressed pur-
pose of Congress to disallow such power to the President and to require him ... to put 
the matter to Congress and ask for specific authority from it, could not be more decisive if 
it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 .... 
Grafting upon the words (of the Act] a purpose of Congress thus unequivocally ex-
pressed is the regular legislative mode for defining the scope of an Act of Congress .... 
By the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress said to the President, 'You 
may not seize .... "') (emphasis added); see id. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring) (commit-
ting similar error of treating non-enactment as apparent equivalent of prohibition). 
Frankfurter's approach seems utterly indefensible. Congress's "purpose" of not al-
lowing the seizure technique of course could have been more authoritatively expressed if 
it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Taft-Hartley Act as a prohibition. Congress 
did not say to the President 'You may not seize.' Congress said 'You may do this and this 
and this.' To be sure, if one's baseline rule is that the President has no legitimate author-
ity to "execute" anything more than what Congress has legislated, then the effect of a 
failure to enact is to withhold authority, whether or not Congress considered and voted 
up-or-down on the proposed power not enacted. But that is Justice Black's preferred 
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The only thing even arguably missing from Justice Black's 
majority opinion is discussion of what to do if the Constitution's 
allocation of powers between Congress and the President is, as 
applied to a certain question, uncertain or indeterminate, and 
whether indicia of congressional "inertia, indifference, or quies-
cence" (to use Justice Jackson's language) might be construed 
more generously in favor of presidential authority under such 
circumstances. But such discussion was not truly "missing" be-
cause such a situation was not presented on the facts of the 
Youngstown case. As construed by Black (for the majority), the 
Constitution's allocation of power concerning the seizure of do-
mestic industries was not at all uncertain: The Commander-in-
Chief power is not a power to seize domestic industries or oth-
erwise to conscript people or resources. That is a legislative 
power.47 The "executive Power" is only a power to execute laws, 
not to make or enlarge them.48 Nor does the President possess a 
general, non-textual emergency power to legislate: "The Foun-
ders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Con-
gress alone in good and bad times."49 Youngstown did not in-
constitutional baseline and (apparently) not Justice Frankfurter's or Justice Jackson's, 
despite their willingness to sign on to the majority opinion. Under Black's analysis, it 
appears sufficient that Congress did not affirmatively enact seizure authority; Congress 
either authorized presidential seizure of industry or it did not. (Of course, like any good 
opinion-writer, Black notes the additional fact in favor of his view, that Congress rejected 
a proposal to include such seizure authority." ld. at 586 & nn.3-5.) Frankfurter's mistake 
(and Jackson's, following him) is believing that congressional authorization sometimes 
can be inferred from something less than an enactment passed in accordance with the 
procedure set forth in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution. Since, under such an ap-
proach, authorization can come from something less than enactment, repudiation of such 
authority requires something more than non-enactment. Thus, Frankfurter (and Jack-
son) need to ratchet-up legislative history to the level of a specific statutory prohibition 
in order for the President not to have such authority. Black's approach does not require 
this. The President lacks authority if it has not been given to him. 
(It is little wonder that a subsequent Court that wished to find implicit authorization 
for or consent to presidential action would be inclined to emphasize the approach of the 
Youngstown concurrences, rather than the majority opinion. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 
453 U.S. at 660-61,668-69,674-78, 686.) 
47. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 ("This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for 
its military authorities."). As Justice Jackson's concurrence amplifies, it is Congress, not 
the President, that has the power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a 
navy; nor does the power of Commander-in-Chief "of the Army and Navy" make the 
President Commander-in-Chief of the Nation. ld. at 641-43 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
48. Id. at 587-88. On this point, Justice Black's simpler analysis is far more coher-
ent and persuasive than Justice Jackson's elaborate, convoluted disavowal of "the rigidity 
dictated by a doctrinaire textualism" in preference for according enumerated powers 
"the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications," 
id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring), while simultaneously rejecting a broad interpretation 
of the general grant of "the executive Power" because of the subsequent textual enu-
meration of certain specific powers. 
49. Id. at 589. 
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volve any question of uncertain distribution of constitutional 
power. It was a Category III case, pure and simple. President 
Truman was legislating a seizure of domestic industry, and such 
legislation was not authorized by any Article II power or by any 
congressional delegation of power. 
But if Youngstown did not truly present a case where the 
Constitution's distribution of powers was uncertain, what should 
be the approach where such uncertainty does exist-as is often 
the case in matters of war and foreign affairs? Justice Black's 
majority opinion omits any discussion of this situation, probably 
because it was not presented by the facts of the case and any 
such discussion would have been dicta inappropriate for the 
Opinion of the Court as a whole. 
It was left to Justice Jackson's concurrence (and the other 
concurrences) to supply such dicta. Jackson's approach does not 
contradict Black's. Rather, it can be understood as stating a fur-
ther-and I submit correct-second-order rule for separation-of-
powers disputes, applicable where the Constitution's allocation 
of powers between Congress and the President is, as applied to a 
given situation, unclear, or indeterminate, or involves overlap-
ping spheres of authority. Jackson's Category II can best be 
seen as a rule of (i) judicial deference (ii) to an authoritatively-
expressed congressional constitutional interpretation of the scope 
of presidential power, (iii) where the Constitution's allocation of 
power between Congress and the President on the matter in ques-
tion falls within a legitimate range of uncertainty or its application 
to particular circumstances is unclear. It is a rule that recognizes 
that the Court's interpretation of the scope of presidential power 
should, in doubtful cases, take into account the President's and 
Congress's interpretations of the scope of such presidential 
power. 
Jackson's concurrence does not quite express the principle 
this way. It is not cast in terms of congressional "interpretation" 
of the Constitution but, more generally and diffusely, about 
drawing inferences from congressional action or inaction. In ad-
dition (as I will discuss presently), it imposes no discipline for de-
termining when Congress's views have been authoritatively ex-
pressed. But the famous Jackson opinion is all about how 
interpretation of the Constitution, in uncertain cases involving 
separation of powers between Congress and the President, 
should be affected by the views of the actors themselves as re-
flected in their actions. Jackson's opinion is quintessentially 
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about the legitimate and proper effect on the judiciary of the 
constitutional interpretations of the political branches. 
I call this a "second-order" rule. It is second-order in the 
sense that it is not a rule of direct constitutional interpretation, 
but a rule concerning what to do where inquiry under first-order 
principles of interpretation (such as consideration of the Consti-
tution's text, structure, and historical evidence of original mean-
ing) fails to yield a sufficiently determinate answer, or yields a 
range of legitimate answers none of which is sufficiently prefer-
able to the others in terms of first-order interpretive principles 
that it can be called the "right" answer. 5° 
Youngstown's "Category II" is best understood as a cate-
gory that consists of such questions. It is a rule of decision-a 
"default rule" -about what a court should do on a separation of 
powers question involving the line between presidential and 
congressional power where the "right" answer is not satisfacto-
rily clear even after careful study of constitutional text, structure 
and history. It is a rule of judicial deference, not terribly unlike 
other such rules of interpretive deference.51 In short, Category 
II is properly a second-order decision rule for the judiciary in 
cases that concern the scope of presidential constitutional power 
50. Vasan Kesavan and I have argued elsewhere that the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to the meaning the words and phrases employed would have had, 
considered in historical context and within the context of the document as a whole, to an 
ordinary, reasonably-informed reader or speaker of the English language at the time the 
text was adopted as law. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia 
Unconstitutional?, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 293,398-99 (2002); Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the authors) (forthcoming 2003). This basic proposition can be 
refined and qualified in a number of ways, but this statement is sufficient to illustrate 
what I mean by "first-order" principles of constitutional interpretation. (There are, ob-
viously, other, competing approaches to first-order constitutional interpretation.) "Sec-
ond-order" rules are rules governing how to interpret or apply the Constitution when 
first-order principles fail to yield tolerably clear answers, or produce a range of legitimate 
answers none of which fairly can be privileged over the others. 
51. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). See Michael Stokes Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 333 (cited in note 
3): 
The presumption of constitutionality and the Chevron deference principle sug-
gest a more general rule of judicial restraint:. A court should n.ot su?st~tute its 
interpretation of a text for that of the pohucal branches (actmg Withm their 
proper spheres) when more t~an one interpretation is possible, ther~ i_s no prin-
cipled rule supplied by test, history, structure, and precedent that pnvlleges one 
reading over the other, and the political branches have acted pursuant to one 
such reading. 
There are a number of other rules of alleged interpretive deference, some of which 
are of highly dubious validity. But that is a topic for another occasion. See generally Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, Activist Judicial Restraint (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
author) (forthcoming 2003). 
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vis-a-vis Congress, where there exists a sufficiently clear congres-
sional interpretation of the scope of the President's constitu-
tional power and that interpretation supports the President. 
Specifically, where Congress agrees with the President's inter-
pretation of the scope of his constitutional and statutory powers, 
the courts should defer to that position, unless it is wrong as a 
matter of direct constitutional interpretation. The courts should 
not lightly invalidate, on separation of powers grounds involving 
congressional versus presidential power, presidential action that 
Congress concedes to be within the president's domain. Only if 
it can be said, with a sufficient degree of confidence, on first-
order constitutional interpretive principles, that the president's 
action is unconstitutional-unconstitutional irrespective of what-
ever Congress thinks-should a court invalidate it. 
This makes sense, on two grounds. The first has to do with 
what it means in the first place for a court to say that some 
presidential action (or some act of Congress) is "unconstitu-
tional." Practically by definition, it means that the President's 
(or Congress's) action is contrary to-in irreconcilable variance 
with-some rule of law supplied by the text of the Constitution.52 
What happens when the Constitution is unclear? If there is no 
rule supplied by the text, how is a Court to decide? In many 
cases, the answer will be simply that the Constitution fails to 
supply a legal rule or principle that invalidates the action taken 
by the political body (Congress, the President, state legislatures 
or governors). Accordingly, the action of the political body 
stands, because it cannot be said to be unconstitutional. 
This principle is a bit harder to apply in separation-of-
powers cases, where the question is which political body has 
governing authority under the Constitution.53 If the contention 
52. This is the core of the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177-80 (1803) and of Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Garry Wills, ed. The Federalist Papers 
388 (Bantam Books, 1982). The power of judicial review takes as its premise that the 
Constitution is a species of law of a higher order than the acts of the legislature or of the 
executive (or of the judiciary, I would add). Because courts are charged with applying 
the law, they must give effect to the law of superior rather than inferior obligation. Thus, 
where the Constitution supplies a rule of law contrary to the rule specified by a legisla-
tive enactment, courts must apply the Constitution rather than the statute. If the Consti-
tution does not supply such a rule of law, the rationale for judicial review set forth in 
Marbury and Federalist 78 evaporates. 
53. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting): 
Where a private citizen challenges action of the Government on grounds unre-
lated to separation of powers, harmonious functioning of the system demands 
that we ordinarily give some deference, or a presumption of validity, to the ac-
tions of the political branches in what is agreed, between themselves at least, to 
be within their respective spheres. But where the issue pertains to separation of 
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in a case challenging presidential action is that the President's 
act violates the Constitution's separation of powers by invading 
the province of Congress, then, if the Constitution's allocation of 
powers in this regard is genuinely uncertain or its application to 
the particular situation unclear, there needs to be some rule for 
deciding how to resolve the legal challenge to the President's ac-
tion. One possible such rule would be to uphold the presidential 
action on the theory that the president's action cannot be said to 
violate the Constitution if it is not clear that he lacks the power 
at issue. Another possible rule would be just the opposite: in-
validate the presidential action, on the theory that the president 
only has power where the Constitution clearly bestows it, or 
where Congress has granted it by legislation. The former default 
rule favors presidential power at the expense of Congress; the 
latter favors congressional power at the expense of the Presi-
dent. Each has something to say for it and each has a plausible 
textual argument in its favor. 54 
But if it is unclear which of these dueling default rules 
should prevail, at least it should be clear that where the Consti-
tution's precise allocation of power between Congress and the 
President is uncertain or indeterminate the judiciary should de-
fer to a congressional constitutional interpretation that itself de-
fers to presidential power. For in that case, both alternatives 
converge in favor of the same result. Thus, when the two politi-
cal branches are in accord as to how the Constitution's ambigu-
ous allocation of powers between them should play out in a 
given context or situation, the Court should accept -indeed, must 
accept-the political branch's agreed judgment, for in such a 
case, the Constitution supplies no rule of law invalidating the 
President's action and the Congress agrees that the President's 
action lies within the scope of his power. 
powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disagreement, neither can be 
presumed correct. 
54. The pro-executive view might be thought to flow from the existence of a resid-
ual or interstitial "executive power," or some other presidential power under Article II. 
The pro-congressional view might be thought to flow from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, U.S. Canst. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, if one construes that clause to constitute an exclu-
sive assignment of the interstitial or implied powers vested by the Constitution "in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," preclusive 
of, and pre-emptive of, action by such Departments or Officers regardless of whether 
Congress has acted or not-in effect, a "dormant" Necessary and Proper Clause. i"!plied 
prohibition on actions by coordinate branches, where such actiOns woul~ fall w1thm the 
scope of Congress's (unexercised) Necessary and Proper Clause leg~slatlve power. U.S. 
Canst. Art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
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The second reason why it is appropriate for courts to accept 
Congress's constitutional interpretation in support of presiden-
tial power is that the Constitution does not vest interpretive ex-
clusivity with respect to the Constitution's allocation of powers 
in the courts in the first place. Rather, it appears to contemplate 
more of a three-branch model for construing and applying the 
allocation. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 49, 
" [ t ]he several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the 
terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evi-
dent, can pretend to an exclusive or superior ri?ht of settling the 
boundaries between their respective powers. "5 The application 
of separation-of-powers principles to the power of constitutional 
interpretation-and especially constitutional interpretation con-
cerning allocation of powers among the branches-very strongly 
suggests a three-branch approach, in which courts accord sub-
stantial deference to a common constitutional view embraced by 
both Congress and the President that falls within the range of 
meaning afforded by an indefinite or overlapping allocation of 
constitutional power between them. 56 
All of this may be seen as consistent with Justice Jackson's 
description of "Category II" constitutional issues, with certain 
small differences and refinements. Jackson put the principle this 
way: 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as 
a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law. 57 
Jackson's general statement of the principle is, overall, very 
good. There are certain areas where the Constitution's distribu-
tion of authority is uncertain, or concurrent. (As I shall argue 
presently, the war power is one of them.) In such areas, it should 
55. Federalist 49 (Madison) 254,255 (cited in note 52). 
56. For a systematic defense of the principle of co-ordinate, co-equal constitutional 
interpretive power in all three branches, see Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in 
note 3); Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. at 1347-59 (cited in note 3). 
57. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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matter, and matter greatly, what Congress has said and done (or 
not done) concerning the scope of the President's powers. 
This begs a further question: What should count as authori-
tative congressional interpretation of the Constitution? Here, 
Justice Jackson's approach becomes analytically vulnerable. In-
deed, Jackson's concurrence becomes almost hopelessly fuzzy 
when it comes to describing what might count as evidence of 
congressional "inertia, indifference or quiescence" sufficient to 
constitute Congress having "enable[ d]" or "invite~ d)" the exer-
cise of "independent presidential responsibility." 8 As noted 
earlier, Jackson appears to fall victim to the same analytic error 
as Justice Frankfurter: the willingness to construe Congress's 
non-enactment of specific authority as sometimes the equivalent 
of a prohibition on the exercise of such authority (as in Youngs-
town itself, in the case of seizure authority) and, apparently, 
sometimes as the equivalent of implied authority (or at least en-
abled or invited action) arising from Congress's inertia, indiffer-
ence, or quiescence. 
This error is similar to the one that has fueled today's de-
bates over the use of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion. The only thing Congress actually enacts into law is the text 
of the statute itself. While it might sometimes be legitimate to 
look to legislative history in order to ascertain the meaning the 
words of the statute had, in context, to those who were using 
them (discounted by the fact that such legislative history is now 
frequently created precisely to "spin" statutory interpretation, 
and by its possible unreliability in other respects), surely the least 
legitimate use of such legislative history is to generate non-
enacted authority or prohibitions, or effectively to repeal or alter 
provisions actually enacted. 
The same is true when it comes to interpreting congres-
sional non-enactment for purposes of evaluating the scope of 
the President's delegated or constitutional authority to act. 
Congress acts only by passing bills that become law. Thus, with 
respect to statutorily delegated power, Congress's refusal to 
grant seizure authority is not a prohibition of such authority; it is 
simply a failure to grant such authority. Likewise, Congress's 
grant of certain statutory authority and failure specifically to 
prohibit other exercises of power surely does not imply a further 
grant, or concession, of such non-enacted authority to the Presi-
58. ld. 
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dent.59 Nor does anything not enacted by Congress tell us any-
thing authoritative about Congress's constitutional interpreta-
tions of presidential power. 
The better approach, I submit, is as follows. Congress may 
grant statutory authority by enacting it into the text of a statute. 
Where Congress has not so granted statutory authority, statutory 
authority does not exist. Whether the President possesses such 
authority anyway, as a matter of Article II presidential constitu-
tional power, is a different question logically unaffected by the 
presence or absence of a grant of statutory authority. Where the 
President's independent constitutional power is clear, the pres-
ence of statutory authority merely confirms or clarifies such ex-
isting presidential constitutional authority. Where presidential 
constitutional authority is uncertain, however, Congress's consti-
tutional interpretation of the scope of the President's constitu-
tional powers matters much more. An interpretation supportive 
of presidential power reinforces the President's constitutional 
position while an interpretation repudiating the President's posi-
tion weakens it. But Congress's constitutional interpretations 
cannot properly be divined from non-enactments, any more than 
can statutory grants (or prohibitions) of authority. Just as Con-
gress may legislate authority (or prohibitions) only by passing 
laws pursuant to the Article I, section 7 process, so too Congress 
may authoritatively express its constitutional views only by pass-
ing laws pursuant to the Article I, section 7 process. In short, 
statutes count; inferences from non-enactments or from legisla-
tive history do not. 60 
Once Congress has acted in a properly authoritative manner 
by enacting a statute, such enactments should have considerable 
force as acts of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, Congress's 
enacted constitutional interpretations should enjoy the same 
status as authoritative constitutional interpretations of the legis-
lative branch as judicial decisions have as the authoritative con-
stitutional interpretations of the judicial branch. A statute em-
59. The reasoning of Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), is, of course, inconsis-
tent with my analysis here. 
60. In addition, the Senate may authoritatively interpret the Constitution-on be-
half of the Senate alone-in the course of exercising its share of any power that it exer-
cises independent of the House of Representatives. Thus, the Senate's final judgments in 
cases of impeachment; its consent to treaties; and its approval or rejection of an ap-
pointment, each could become the occasion for the Senate authoritatively expressing its 
constitutional views. Similarly, the House may be able to express its constitutional views 
with respect to impeachment in the course of its decisions to bring or not bring certain 
charges. 
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bodying a constitutional interpretation should be viewed as 
analogous to a judicial decision or precedent interpreting the 
Constitution. The branches have simply acted in the respective 
ways in which they are authorized by the Constitution to act-
Congress by exercising the legislative power of passing laws and 
the courts by exercising the judicial power of deciding cases.61 
The President's authoritative constitutional interpretations 
may come in the context of performing any of the Presidency's 
myriad independent and shared constitutional powers: vetoing 
bills, issuing pardons, executing laws, recommending measures, 
conducting foreign affairs, commanding the nation's armed 
forces, or-as with Truman's order in the Youngstown case-
issuing executive orders purporting to have the force of law.62 
Jackson's Category 1-11-111 paradigm is properly viewed as ad-
dressing the degree of deference to be accorded presidential 
constitutional interpretation, at least by the Courts. Somewhat 
restated, the framework can be summarized as follows. Cate-
gory 1: Where the President's interpretation is in accord with 
Congress's interpretation of the President's constitutional pow-
ers, that agreement has the strongest claim to judicial deference. 
In such a case, a court may invalidate the President's action only 
if it can be said, unequivocally, that the constitutional judgment 
of both the President and Congress is wrong. The President's 
constitutional interpretation, supported by Congress's constitu-
tional interpretation, would be (to borrow Justice Jackson's lan-
guage) "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of per-
suasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."63 
Category II: Where it is unclear whether, or the extent to which, 
Congress has embraced the President's constitutional position, 
the judiciary is left without any helpful assistance in considering 
the underlying, first-order issue of the constitutional validity of 
the President's action. Reading the tea-leaves of Congress's lack 
of authoritative interpretive action does not further the enter-
61. I believe that the authoritative constitutional interpretations of Congress and of 
the courts (and of the President) also should have the same status vis-a-vis each other. 
See generally Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 217 (cited in note 3). But that controver-
sial point is not necessary to my position here. My claim here is only that whatever power 
of constitutional interpretation Congress possesses, it is exercised by passing legislation, 
just as the courts' power of constitutional interpretation is exercised by deciding cases. 
62. Sec id. at 241-84 (arguing that the President possesses a power of constitutional 
legal review parallel to the judiciary's power of constitutional legal review, and setting 
forth the contexts in which it properly might be exercised). 
63. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2002] YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR 237 
prise of constitutional interpretation in a particularly meaningful 
way. Category III: Where Congress has adopted, by affirmative 
legislative enactment within the scope of its constitutional pow-
ers, the negative of the President's interpretive position (as it has 
in some respects with regard to the war power, for example, in 
the War Powers Resolution), the President's interpretive posi-
tion should enjoy no judicial presumption of validity, or defer-
ence. The President's position is right only if it is right, as a mat-
ter of constitutional law. The Court is forced to choose between 
the constitutional positions asserted, respectively, by the Presi-
dent and by the Congress. 64 
How do these principles apply to the power to wage war? 
Interpreting the Constitution's allocations of power with respect 
to war is one of the most significant, recurrent, and historically 
troubled fields of constitutional law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
did not specifically address itself to, and does not answer, this 
question. But it does supply a valuable way of thinking about it. 
In that respect, Youngstown is arguably the most important deci-
sion ever rendered by the Supreme Court on the question of 
constitutional war powers, even though that was not the question 
before the Court. 
Ill. YOUNGSTOWN GOES TO WAR 
The Constitution's allocation of power with respect to war is 
simple enough in the abstract, but notoriously ambiguous and 
uncertain in its application. To compress the debate drastically: 
Traditionally, the "executive power" was understood at the time 
of the framing as including the power of war and peace, and all 
external relations of the nation.65 The founding generation so 
understood this traditional arrangement, embraced in various 
forms by Locke, Blackstone, Montesquieu, and others,66 but 
feared concentration of power and therefore re-assigned to the 
Congress the powers to "declare War";67 to "raise and support 
Armies [and] ... provide and maintain a Navy";68 to "make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
64. Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cited in note 
53). 
65. For an excellent, comprehensive treatment of the text and historical under· 
standing of the Constitution on this point, see Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001). 
66. See id. at 265-72. 
67. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 11. 
68. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 12; U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 13. 
238 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:215 
Forces";69 and to "define and punish. . . . Offences against the 
Law of Nations."70 In addition, the Framers gave Congress the 
wonderfully indefinite and enduringly controversial Sweeping 
Clause power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."71 
Finally, the Senate was given the power to advise and consent on 
ambassadorial (and other) appointments and (by two-thirds 
vote) treaty formation. 72 
But the President was left with whatever remained of the 
traditional "executive power" in matters of war, peace, and for-
eign affairs, diminished to a significant extent, but not com-
pletely, by the re-allocation of some very important, traditionally 
executive, powers to Congress.73 The President was to retain the 
traditional executive power over foreign affairs, qualified by the 
Senate's check on appointments and shared power in making 
any treaty that would have force as United States law. 74 In addi-
tion, the President was specifically made "Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States."75 Finally, history 
very strongly suggests-and the Constitutional Convention's de-
bate over and adoption of a congressional power "to declare 
War" as distinguished from a power "to make War" tends to 
confirm-that the "executive" power was understood at the time 
to include a power to defend the nation when attacked or in im-
minent danger of attack and that Congress's constitutional 
power "to declare war" was not meant to displace this traditional 
executive power (and duty).76 
69. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 14. 
70. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8, cl. 10. 
71. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
72. U.S. Const. Art. II,§ 2, cl. 2. 
73. See generally Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 231 (cited in note 65). 
74. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 2, cl. 2. 
75. U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 2, cl. 1. 
76. Prakash and Ramsey, 111 Yale L.J. at 285 (cited in note 65); Louis Fisher, 
Presidential War Power 6-8 (U. Press of Kansas, 1995). 
The President is also charged by oath to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Consti-
tution of the United States, a duty that might well be thought to impose an obligation to 
defend the existence of the nation whose Constitution it is, with military force if neces-
sary, against external and internal enemies who seek to destroy or dismember the nation, 
and that this duty exists whether Congress has declared war or not. President Abraham 
Lincoln thought of the oath in such terms. Letter to Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864) re-
printed in Abraham Lincoln, 2 Speeches & Writings, 1859-1865 at 585 (Libr~ry.of Amer-
ica, 1989) ("I did understand, however, that my oath to preserve the constitution to the 
best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable 
means, that government-that nation-of which that constitution was the organic law.") 
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The several constitutional provisions suggest a clear but 
crude division of power: Congress has the power to initiate or 
create a state of war and the President does not. The President 
has the remainder of the "executive" power with respect to 
war-and Congress does not. This includes the Commander-in-
Chief power to conduct war: the power to "execute," as it were, 
any authorized war; the power to decide whether, when, and 
how to employ the Nation's armed force in carrying out Con-
gress's authorization to use such force; and the power to decide 
when to cease such use of force. In addition, the President has 
the traditional executive power to defend the Nation against 
sudden attacks and respond to such attacks or imminent threats 
as will not admit of delay. Congress does not possess any of 
these executive war powers. 77 
The obvious problem is that the respective constitutional 
war powers of Congress and the President overlap. How they 
apply to particular instances is, therefore, not always clear. 
Where, for example, does the President's traditional executive 
power to defend the nation and repel attacks leave off and Con-
gress's power "to declare War" begin? May a President initiate 
military hostilities against another nation, for the purpose of de-
fending the United States against an anticipated attack? Or is 
such exercise of force essentially offensive, falling within Con-
gress's exclusive power to declare war? Similarly, how does the 
Commander-in-Chief power to wage a congressionally-
authorized war interact with Congress's control of the scope of 
authorization? May Congress limit the objectives or means of 
war? Or is this an interference with the President's exclusive 
power to direct and command the use of military force? 
The Presidential Oath Clause does not appear, at least in form, to be a grant of power to 
the President. Probably the better understanding is that it imposes a duty with respect to 
the exercise of a power granted elsewhere-as in the clause vesting "the executive 
Power" in the President-and is an allusion to that power. See Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1993) (noting that Presiden· 
tial Take Care and Oath clauses "are simply expressions of the constitutional nature of 
'The executive Power'"). 
77. If the power to defend the nation against sudden attacks lies outside Congress's 
power to declare war and wholly within the residual "executive Power" of the President, 
Congress may not seek to control the President's exercise of that exclusively presidential 
power. Congress's legislative power under the Necessary and Proper Clause may be used 
to pass laws that assist the President in carrying out his constitutional duties; or that pur-
port to restrict him to the bounds on his power established by the Constitution (the latter 
being Congress's way of interpreting and seeking to enforce the Constitution). But Con-
gress may not enact laws that operate to inhibit the President's exercise of a power that is 
legitimately within the scope of the President's constitutional powers under Article II of 
the Constitution. 
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It is precisely for issues of this type-issues of separation of 
powers and overlapping of powers- that the opinions in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube provide useful paradigms. The approach of 
Justice Black's majority opinion is exactly the right place to start 
when considering the President's power to employ military 
force. To paraphrase Black's opinion: The President's power, if 
any, to employ military force must stem either from congres-
sional authorization or from the Constitution itself (that is, from 
the President's independent Article II constitutional powers). 
Some cases are easy: Where Congress has declared war on an 
enemy nation or entity, the President has clear constitutional 
power to employ military force against that enemy. (In Jack-
son's taxonomy, this is a "Category I" war power situation. The 
President's power is at its apex, because he is acting pursuant to 
explicit congressional authority to execute all the constitutional 
powers of Congress with respect to this matter, plus whatever 
independent constitutional powers the President possesses with 
respect to the matter.78) 
Absent such congressional authorization, the President's au-
thority to employ military force must be found in some provision 
of the Constitution.79 As noted, the Constitution divides the war 
power between Congress and the President. Each allocation of 
power must be given effect. A construction that would permit 
Congress to control the conduct of military hostilities-the exe-
cution of war-or disable the President from exercising the re-
sidual executive power of defending the Nation against attack is 
not consistent with the Constitution. Equally, however, a con-
struction of the Constitution that would give the President the 
entire power with respect to war-the decision whether to initi-
ate military hostilities with another nation or enemy entity-is 
not consistent with the Constitution. It is thus also an easy case 
under the Constitution (however much this constitutional prin-
ciple historically has been honored in its breach) that the Presi-
dent does not possess legitimate legal authority to initiate hostili-
ties between the United States and another nation of a 
magnitude and intensity sufficient to constitute "war" without 
congressional authorization, absent a situation of sudden or im-
minent attack. (In Jackson's terms, this is the "Category III" 
war power situation: the President's power is at its lowest, and 
unilateral presidential action can be sustained only if the Presi-
78. See Youngstown, 343 at 635-36 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
79. ld. at 585, 587 (majority opinion). 
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dent has independent constitutional power to take the Nation to 
war.) Just as President Truman did not have legitimate constitu-
tional power to seize the nation's steel mills without congres-
sional authorization, the President does not have legitimate con-
stitutional power to take the nation to "war"- to initiate 
hostilities, as opposed to repelling sudden or imminent attacks 
on the United States-without congressional authorization.80 
But there are also hard cases-"Category II" war power 
cases-where the President and Congress "may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain."81 Justice 
Jackson's Youngstown concurrence supplies a valuable paradigm 
for determining how the war power applies in these situations. 
Because presidential and congressional war powers overlap, it 
matters greatly how Congress, through actual legislative enact-
ments, has interpreted the Constitution with respect to the 
President's constitutional authority to employ military force. 
Where Congress has granted the President authority, by formal 
declaration of war or by comparable statutory authorization or 
delegation, the question is chiefly one of the meaning and legal 
effect of its enactment, when coupled with the President's consti-
tutional powers. Where Congress by legislation has enacted a 
view or interpretation of the branches' respective constitutional 
war powers, either in connection with authorizing the President's 
use of military force in a specific context (as I shall argue is the 
case with the 9-18-01 Resolution) or as freestanding legislation 
(as with the War Powers Resolution of 1973), the question is 
whether Congress's enacted constitutional interpretation rein-
forces, resists, or simply does not affect, the President's claim of 
constitutional authority to act and how such congressional rein-
forcement, resistance, or neutrality with respect to the Presi-
80. Employing the paradigms of Youngstown, the conclusion seems unavoidable-
notwithstanding how hard the Court in Youngstown worked to avoid it-that President 
Truman's commitment of U.S. forces to the Korean War was unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
id. at 587 (majority opinion) (rejecting "Commander in Chief' power as justification for 
seizure without addressing constitutionality of Korean War); id. at 643 (Jackson, J., con-
curring) ("I do not, however, find it necessary or appropriate to consider the legal status 
of the Korean enterprise to discountenance argument based on it."). There is not much 
room for doubt that the Korean War was, if not at its inception very shortly thereafter, a 
"war" within the meaning of the Constitution. Congress did not declare war or authorize 
military action in any way. Truman purported to be acting pursuant to authority con-
ferred by the United Nations, but nothing in the U.N. treaty committed the United States 
to military action other than through the nation's constitutional processes and the United 
States constitutional process was never employed to authorize use of military force. See 
Fisher Presidential War Power at 84-91 (cited in note 76). 
81. Youngstown, at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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dent's claimed authority should affect the constitutional calculus 
in such doubtful war powers cases. 
It would be foolish to attempt (not to mention impossible to 
accomplish), in this short article, a review of the constitutional 
lawfulness under this paradigm of the hundreds of arguably 
"Category II war power" situations that have occurred in our na-
tion's history.82 Instead, I will limit myself here to discussing the 
two most important acts of congressional constitutional interpre-
tation in this area in the past thirty years: The War Powers Reso-
lution of 1973 and the 9-18-01 Resolution authorizing military 
force in the present war. Both are extant, legally operative, au-
thoritative congressional interpretations of the scope of presi-
dential war powers, and each can be seen as fitting into Youngs-
town's paradigms. 
A. THEW AR POWERS RESOLUTION AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Consider first the War Powers Resolution, passed by Con-
gress and enacted into law over President Richard Nixon's veto 
in 1973. As noted at the outset of this article, the War Powers 
Resolution was and remains a highly contestable congressional 
constitutional interpretation of the scope of presidential war 
powers in the absence of a declaration of war or equivalent con-
gressional authorization of presidential use of military force. 
Whatever the validity of some of the WPR's commands to the 
President-some of which are certainly unconstitutional and 
others of which are highly dubious83 -Congress's constitutional 
interpretation of the branches' respective powers stands on its 
own as a legitimate legislative enactment of Congress's constitu-
tional views. The WPR explicitly begins, in section 2(a), with 
constitutional interpretation. "It is the purpose of this chapter to 
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United 
States," the resolution announces, "and insure that the collective 
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to 
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use 
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. "84 After then 
82. I hope to address these issues at greater length in a forthcoming book on the 
war power. 
83. I discuss these aspects of the War Powers Resolution presently. See infra pp. 
246-249. 
84. War Power Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1994 and Supp. V 1999). I will 
hereinafter use the Public Law section numbers when discussing the War Powers Resolu-
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reciting, in subsection 2(b), Congress's power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause to pass laws "for carrying into execution, 
not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
department or officer thereof,"85 the WPR proceeds, in subsec-
tion 2(c), to provide Congress's interpretation of the scope of the 
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief: 
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised 
only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack 
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces. 86 
As an act of constitutional interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's allocation of the war power, this is not bad. It conforms 
reasonably closely to what I have described above as the respec-
tive spheres of presidential and congressional power in this area, 
including the President's power to defend the Nation against 
sudden or imminent attack. It is simultaneously a congressional 
recognition of, and limitation of, a class of situations involving le-
gitimate presidential use of military forces outside of Category I 
wars. It is a recognition of the reality of Category II war power 
situations. But it is also an enacted statutory description of the 
limits of Congress's "inertia, indifference or quiescence" with re-
spect to such situations: Neither the President nor the courts 
should construe Congress as conceding, through silence or inac-
tion, unilateral presidential constitutional power to act, if it does 
not fall within one of the three described circumstances. 
The other bookend of the War Powers Resolution is section 
8, which, while entitled "Interpretation of joint resolution," ac-
tually prescribes rules of interpretation not merely for the WPR 
but for other congressional enactments, and for U.S. treaties as 
well, as they might be thought to affect questions of presidential 
authority to use the armed forces in situations of actual or prob-
able hostilities. Section 8 imposes strict limits on how congres-
sional enactments and treaties are to be construed with respect 
to the issue of whether the President has been given statutory or 
tion in the text, and use the parallel U.S. Code citations in the footnotes. 
85. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b). 
86. Id. § 1541(c). 
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treaty authority to use military force. Section 8(a) provides that 
"[a]uthority to introduce United States Armed Forces" into hos-
tilities "shall not be inferred" from "any provision of law ... , in-
cluding any provision contained in any appropriations Act" 
unless such provision "specifically authorizes" such introduction 
"and states that it is intended to constitute specJfic statutory au-
thorization within the meaning of this chapter."8 Similarly, such 
authority is not to be inferred "from any treaty heretofore or 
hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legisla-
tion specifically authorizing" the President to use military force 
and that states that it is intended to constitute such specific au-
thorization within the meaning of the WPR.88 Finally, after set-
ting forth certain narrow exceptions to this rule89 and reciting 
that nothing in the WPR "is intended to alter the constitutional 
authority of the Con~ress or of the President, or the provisions 
of existing treaties,"9 section 8(d) concludes with a directive that 
the WPR itself not be construed as conferring any statutory au-
thority on the President: 
Nothing in this chapter ... (2) shall be construed as granting 
any authority to the President with respect to the introduction 
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situa-
tions wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances which authority he would not have had in 
the absence of this chapter.91 
In terms of Youngstown's paradigms, section 8 of the WPR 
is a collection of prohibitions of inferences that otherwise might 
be asserted to support a claim of Category II war power by the 
President. Indeed, it is a rather clear, muscular repudiation of 
any such inferences. No "inertia, indifference, or quiescence" 
here: section 8 excludes, by clear congressional directive, any 
middle ground of "Category II wars" lawfully being waged on 
the claimed authority of debatable inferences from congressional 
enactments or treaties. Either the President has delegated Arti-
cle I war power pursuant to an explicit congressional enactment, 
labeled as such, or he does not; if not, he must rely only on his 
independent Article II war powers (the scope of which Congress 
has sought to define in section 2's enactment of Congress's con-
stitutional interpretation of the Commander-in-Chief clause). 
87. Id. § 1547(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
88. ld. § 1547(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
89. Id. § 1547(b). 
90. Id. § 1547(d)(l). 
91. Id. § 1547(d)(2). 
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The effect is to make the question of presidential war power 
rather more categorically black-and-white-like Justice Black's 
majority opinion in Youngstown-by forcing what otherwise 
might be Category II war power situations into either Category I 
or Category III. If Youngstown is right, this clear congressional 
policy must be given effect. If the legislative enactments (and 
non-enactments) discussed in Youngstown were insufficient to 
support a claim of delegated power to seize the steel mills, all the 
more clearly, under section 8's rules of construction, comparably 
non-specific legislative actions touching on matters of war power 
but not explicitly delegating power to employ military force are 
insufficient to sustain a claim of legislatively-delegated presiden-
tial war authority. The legal reasoning of the Dames & Moore 
case92 -sustaining presidential authority on the basis of a tradi-
tion of congressional deference to unilateral presidential action 
settling claims combined with congressional legislation in the 
neighborhood of granting the President such authority but not 
in fact granting it-has no place in war powers, at least not so 
long as the WPR's provisions remain the law. In sections 2 and 8 
of the War Powers Resolution, Congress formally has enacted 
into law an explicit lack of deference to any tradition of unilat-
eral presidential war authority and an explicit rejection of the 
propriety of inferring authority from legislation in the neighbor-
hood of granting the specific authority at issue but not in fact 
granting it. 
Section 8's inference-prohibitions are, if anything, even 
more clearly appropriate exercises of Congress's constitutional 
powers than section 2's interpretation of the scope of the Presi-
dent's constitutional power. Congress is the master of its own 
statutes and can prescribe rules of interpretation governing its 
own statutes as surely as it may alter or amend the statutes di-
rectly.93 Similarly, with respect to treaties, Congress has power 
to modify or repeal their effect as a matter of U.S. domestic law, 
by passing statutes that accomplish such changes.94 Moreover, 
this type of expression of legislative will is explicitly what Justice 
92. 453 u.s. 654, 675-88. 
93. Professor Prakash and I develop this proposition in forthcoming work. Michael 
Stokes Paulsen and Saikrishna Prakash, The Judicial Activism Abolition Act (provisional 
title) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). For a fascinating defense of 
Congress's power to prescribe rules of federal statutory interpretation, see Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085 
(2002). 
94. Chae Chin Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) ("The Chinese Exclusion 
Case"). 
246 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:215 
Jackson's Category II contemplates: Congress's position-
"inertia, indifference, or quiescence" -matters to interpretation 
of the extent of presidential power in a given context. It is thus 
unquestionably appropriate for Congress to disclaim inertia, in-
difference, or quiescence and prescribe standing rules forbidding 
construction of statutes and treaties from being so understood. 
Between the bookends of section 2's constitutional interpre-
tation and section 8's Category II inference-prohibitions are the 
substantive requirements of the War Powers Resolution-the 
direct "shall" provisions that purport to force the President to 
take or not take specific actions with respect to the introduction 
of military forces into situations of actual or imminent armed 
conflict. As suggested above, these provisions are far more con-
stitutionally problematic. Section 3 directs the President to con-
sult with Congress before introducing armed forces into situa-
tions that are likely to involve such forces in hostilities.95 Section 
4 requires that the President provide written reports and other 
information in such circumstances.96 And section 5 directs the 
President to terminate use of such armed forces in a situation 
where such report was required within sixty days, unless Con-
gress has acted affirmatively or the President has submitted a 
certification that an additional thirty days are needed.97 In addi-
tion, section 5(c) provides that Congress may by "concurrent 
resolution" (that is, without presentment to and approval by the 
President) direct the President to remove armed forces from 
such described situations.98 
This last provision clearly cannot be given operative effect 
consistently with the reasoning of INS v. Chadha, the case in 
which the Supreme Court recognized the unconstitutionality of 
legislative "vetoes" of the exercise of otherwise valid legislative 
delegations of authority to the executive branch.99 Beyond the 
legislative veto problem, it is arguable that all of the substantive 
provisions of the WPR unconstitutionally interfere with the 
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief of the 
nation's military, if-and this is a big "if'-that power is legiti-
mately being exercised by the President in the first place. Put 
differently: If the President's military action falls within the 
scope of his independent constitutional powers and outside Con-
95. 50 u.s.c. § 1542. 
96. Id. § 1543. 
97. Id. § 1544(b). 
98. Id. § 1544(c). 
99. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
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gress's power "to declare war," it is unconstitutional for Con-
gress to direct, control, or regulate the President's action in any 
way that would interfere with his independent constitutional 
prerogative to act. 
On the other hand, if the President in fact is acting ultra 
vires in employing military force-that is, if he is exceeding his 
legitimate executive and Commander-in-Chief constitutional 
powers-these provisions of the War Powers Resolution (with 
the exception of section 5(c)'s procedurally-defective "legisla-
tive veto" provision) are entirely legitimate congressional prohi-
bitions of unconstitutional presidential action. In effect, they di-
rect the President to stop acting unconstitutionally. Such a 
requirement-a statutory command to another branch that it not 
act in an unconstitutional manner, exceeding the scope of its true 
constitutional powers-certainly falls within the scope of Con-
gress's power to pass laws necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the (legitimate) powers of that branch. 100 To be sure, 
such a command is in a sense redundant of what the Constitution 
supposedly commands already (so that the statute's prohibitions 
are merely cumulative, duplicating the Constitution's) and per-
haps futile if the President persists in his unlawful action (or 
holds, in good faith, a different interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's allocations of power), but that does not make Congress's 
enactment improper. The most that can be said is that it might 
make Congress's enactment superfluous, or ineffectual- useless 
howling in the wind. 
But in a constitutional regime in which congressional and 
presidential war powers are recognized as overlapping and in 
some respects concurrent, one must also recognize that the law-
fulness of presidential military action in a given situation is af-
fected by Congress's constitutional interpretation of the scope of 
the President's authority. In this respect, the War Powers Reso-
lution operates, somewhat ironically and probably unintention-
ally, to provide a constitutional "safe harbor" for certain unilat-
eral presidential actions involving the use of military force-a 
zone of nearly unchallengeable exercise of presidential power 
100. For a defense of such an understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
power, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress 
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000). For an 
attack on this view, see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of 
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. Comm. 191 (2001). For a reply and further defense, 
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18 Const. Comm. 
231 (2001). 
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within the zone of twilight marked by the overlap of congres-
sional and presidential war powers, where Congress has by stat-
ute explicitly chosen to accept presidential military initiatives, 
and where it is not clear that the Constitution of its own force 
renders such presidential action unlawful. 
Consider sections 3, 4, and 5 of the War Powers Resolution 
in such light. These provisions can be understood less as effec-
tive, self-executing legal commands to the President than as part 
of Congress's constitutional interpretation of the scope of the 
President's constitutional power, consistent with the general 
view expressed in section 2. Specifically, these provisions collec-
tively establish the situations when presidential use of military 
force will fall within a safe harbor of arguable consistency with 
Congress's interpretation of presidential power under the Con-
stitution as set forth in section 2 of the WPR. While the WPR 
does not authorize presidential action within the sixty-day win-
dow of section 5(b)-recall section 8(d)(2)'s directive that noth-
ing in the WPR "shall be construed as granting any authority to 
the President" with respect to use of military forces-and while 
presidential action within the sixty-day window is not necessarily 
consistent with Congress's general view of the scope of the 
President's constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief set 
forth in section 2, the specific substantive commands and prohi-
bitions of the WPR's middle sections can be understood as 
marking the de facto boundaries of Congress's "quiescence" in 
presidential exercises of Category II war power. 
Similarly, while Congress might not legitimately be able to 
command the President to remove troops from a given situation 
(or as a practical matter might not be able to secure presidential 
compliance with such a directive), Congress properly may de-
clare, prospectively, that certain presidential military orders are, 
in Congress's view, unconstitutional. That view is not wholly 
without effect: As a legitimate congressional enactment into law 
of its constitutional interpretation, that view necessarily will af-
fect the judicial calculus in such a "Category II war" situation, in 
the event such a question could come before a court. And it 
should affect the executive branch's calculus in such a situation 
as well: As noted, if Youngstown's paradigms are sound under-
standings of how the Constitution applies in such separation-of-
powers situations, they are sound understandings of the Consti-
tution that ought to bind and constrain the executive branch 
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whether or not they are enforceable against the executive by the 
courts. 101 
The substantive provisions of the War Powers Resolution 
thus may be understood as part and parcel of the Resolution's 
overall force as an act of congressional constitutional interpreta-
tion: In enacting the War Powers Resolution, Congress has said 
that insofar as presidential war-making power might be thought 
to depend on an inference from congressional action or inaction, 
Congress as a standing rule has specifically repudiated any infer-
ence of authorization, quiescence, or indifference as being con-
trary to its intention. As far as Congress is concerned, there are 
to be no Category II wars "authorized" by inference from trea-
ties, appropriations acts, or any other legislative action or inac-
tion short of specific authorization. 102 Moreover, to the extent 
the President would interpret the Constitution as permitting him 
to introduce armed forces into combat situations on his own au-
thority, Congress's interpretation is that the Constitution does 
not authorize presidential military action outside of the three 
circumstances described in section 2(c)-declaration of war, spe-
cific statutory authorization, or a national emergenc7a created by 
attack upon the United States or its armed forces. 03 And the 
President clearly lacks legitimate constitutional authority unilat-
erally to employ military force outside the de facto sixty day 
"safe harbor" period marked by the WPR's substantive provi-
SIOnS. 
Has Congress's apparent inability to enforce the War Pow-
ers Resolution against the executive waived its constitutional po-
sition? No. Just as the only authoritative way in which Congress 
can assert its constitutional position is by passing legislation, so 
too the only authoritative way in which Congress can retreat 
from or alter that position is by passing legislation. The War 
Powers Resolution, to the extent it stands as Congress's constitu-
tional interpretation and as Congress's set of instructions as to 
101. This is true no matter whether the executive branch or the judicial branch is 
interpreting the Constitution. If Youngstown's approach is a sound, correct interpreta-
tion of the Constitution, it is a sound, correct interpretation of the Constitution whether 
or not the issue at hand is, or ever could be made, the subject of a lawsuit. See Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 907,916 (1994) ("A 
constitutional violation is no less a constitutional violation simply because of the absence 
of a judicial ruling to that effect. The President takes an oath to uphold the Constitution. 
That duty exists whether the courts are able to act on a matter or not. The Constitution 
is binding law for the executive branch as well as for the courts.") 
102. 50 U.S.C. § 1547. 
I 03. I d. § 1541. 
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how other statutes and treaties are to be construed, is not, by the 
fact of being (allegedly) violated, somehow thereby repealed. 
But Congress of course may amend the WPR's constitu-
tional interpretation by enacting subsequent legislation embody-
ing a new, modified, or expanded constitutional interpretation of 
presidential war power. It is in this respect (among others) that 
the September 18, 2001 "Authorization for Use of Military 
Force" -the Resolution that governs the present war on terror-
ism-constitutes a major constitutional event in the history of 
war powers. The 9-18-01 Resolution changes everything. 
B. THE 9-18-01 RESOLUTION AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The September 18 Resolution has both "Youngstown Cate-
gory I" and "Youngstown Category II" war power elements, and 
triggers broad presidential constitutional authority under both 
categories. The resolution, structured as a series of "Whereas" 
statements followed by the specific substantive authorization, 
merits quotation in full: 
PL 107-40 
September 18, 2001 
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
Joint Resolution To authorize the use of United States 
Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks 
launched against the United States 
Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous vio-
lence were committed against the United States and its citi-
zens; and 
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropri-
ate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense 
and to protect United States citizens both at home and 
abroad; and 
Whereas, in light of the theat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts 
of violence; and 
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and ex-
traordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy 
of the United States; and 
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitu-
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tion to take action to deter and prevent acts of international 
terrorism against the United States: Now therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for 
Use of Military Force". 
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.-That the President is authorized to use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future acts of international ter-
rorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons. 
(b) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION-
Consistent with section 8(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution, 
the Congress declares that this section is intended to consti-
tute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS-
Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the 
War Powers Resolution. 
251 
This is a sweeping congressional enactment with respect to 
war powers. In section 2(a), the President is specifically author-
ized, and delegated power in broad terms, to use force against 
not only "nations," but also "organizations or persons" that "he 
determines" "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the Sep-
tember 11 attacks "or harbored" such organizations or persons. 
This is a sweeping delegation of "Category I" war power to the 
President. It is not limited to specific nations or organizations. 
The President is given substantial discretion to identify trans-
gressors and thus targets of military action, including "organiza-
tions" and "persons." In addition, the Resolution contains no in-
struction as to the standard of proof, or degree of connectedness 
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to the September 11 attacks, that is to limit the President's exer-
cise of discretion. The targets are the ones "he determines" 
were involved in some way in those attacks, including those that 
"aided" the attacks and even those who "harbor[ ]" those who 
"aided" the attacks. This is not a standardless delegation, nor a 
blanket unqualified delegation of the entirety of the war power. 
It states an "intelligible standard" for the President to apply, and 
is thus constitutionally legitimate under any modem conception 
of the limits of Congress's authority to legislate in very general 
terms. 104 But it is an extraordinarily broad delegation-arguably 
the broadest congressional delegation of war power in our na-
tion's history. The President of the United States-President 
Bush and his successors- is under no time limit. The authority 
to use military force appears to exist until the President runs out 
of (what he determines to be) legitimate targets. 105 Section 2(a) 
of the 9-18-01 Resolution constitutes a truly extraordinary con-
gressional grant to the President of extraordinary discretion in 
the use of military power for an indefinite period of time. 106 
In addition, the 9-18-01 Resolution's final "whereas" clause 
constitutes an extraordinarily sweeping congressional recogni-
tion of independent presidential constitutional power to employ 
the war power to combat terrorism. The Resolution declares 
Congress's view that "the President has authority under the Con-
stitution to take action to deter and ~revent acts of international 
terrorism against the United States." 07 
It is worth pausing, briefly, to let this sink in: Congress has 
embraced the "inherent presidential authority" view of the war 
power, at least with respect to international terrorism. And it 
104. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-74, 378-79 (1989). A different question might be pre-
sented were Congress to declare war against "all of America's enemies, present or fu-
ture," and delegate to the President the authority to decide who should be deemed an 
enemy. (I owe this hypothetical to my colleague Dan Farber.) 
105. The last clause of Section 2(a) recites that this authority is granted "in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons." It is unclear whether this clause broadens, narrows, or 
does not affect the scope of authority granted in the preceding clauses. Most likely, it 
simply establishes a purpose for which the grant of authority is conferred, but is neither 
an enlargement of that grant nor a limitation on its exercise. 
106. It is also remarkable that the congressional vote was nearly unanimous. The 
vote was 420-1 in the House, vote 342 (available at <http://clerkweb.gov/cgi-binl 
vote.exe?year=2001&rollnumber=342>), and 98-0 in the Senate, vote 281 (available at 
<http://senate.gov/legislativevote 1 071/vote-00281.html>). 
107. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (Sept. 18, 2001) (emphasis added). 
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has embraced this position whole hog: The President may take 
pre-emptive action to combat terrorism. 
This is a new congressional interpretation of the scope of 
presidential war powers. In effect, this clause of the 9-18-01 
Resolution appears to revise and amend-more specifically, to 
expand- the WPR's described categories of constitutionally 
permissible presidential use of military force to include a fourth 
category of presidential constitutional authority: Beyond decla-
ration of war; beyond specific statutory authorization; beyond 
even national emergency created by an attack on the United 
States or its armed forces; the President "has authority under the 
Constitution" to "take action to deter and prevent acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States. "108 This near-
unanimous congressional interpretation of the Constitution es-
sentially recognizes constitutional power in the President to con-
duct, in Youngstown terms, a "Category II War"on terrorism go-
ing beyond even the sweeping terms of the specifically-
authorized Category I War against those nations, organizations 
or persons the President determines are responsible for, or as-
sisted, the attacks of September 11, 2001. The 9-18-01 Resolu-
tion thus gives the President sweeping Category I war power 
plus an equally sweeping congressional constitutional interpre-
tive "penumbra" of a zone of independent presidential constitu-
tional power surrounding it. Indeed, given the breadth of Con-
gress's recognition of Category II war authority in the President 
to combat terrorism, and the breadth of Section 2's explicit au-
thorization, one could well speak of the Resolution as conferring 
Category I authority plus recognizing "Category I W' war au-
thority in the President. 
There is nothing at all constitutionally improper about this. 
Indeed, in many respects it seems a perfect illustration of 
Youngstown's paradigms. As extraordinary as the 9-18-01 Reso-
lution is, this broad grant-plus-concession-of-power combination 
108. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001) (emphasis added). While the "Whereas" clauses do not themselves have the force 
of a legal requirement and are not, strictly speaking, part of Congress's authorization for 
the use of force, they are part of the legislation Congress has enacted into law, just as is 
section 2 of the War Powers Resolution (containing Congress's declaration of "Purpose 
and Policy"). One can accept the traditional canon that preambles and whereas clauses 
c?nstitute no part of the substantive legislative enactment following the enacting clause, 
Smger, ed., Sutherland Statutory Construction 123 (West Group, 2002), yet still recognize 
that statements of legislative understandings embodied in such provisions are part of the 
overall enactment. As such, they constitute valid, authoritative expressions, enacted into 
statutory law, of Congress's interpretation of the Constitution. 
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is constitutionally appropriate. As noted, Congress may dele-
gate its war power so long as it supplies an intelligble standard 
to guide the President's exercise of his discretion. 1 And, as ar-
gued above, Congress's constitutional interpretations in support 
of presidential power, in a genuine "Category II war power" 
situation of overlapping congressional and presidential author-
ity, should be treated as dispositive of any separation-of-powers 
legal challenge to the President's actions, unless it can be said 
that Congress and the President are both wrong as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
It is hard to say that Congress's position in support of presi-
dential power, embraced in the 9-18-01 Resolution, is not within 
the range of legitimate interpretation of the Constitution's allo-
cation of war power. If ever there was a cluster of situations fal-
ling within the "zone of twilight" marked out by the Constitu-
tion's division of the war power, it would seem to be the 
situation described in the last "whereas" clause of the 9-18-01 
Resolution: constitutional authority "to take action to deter and 
prevent acts of international terrorism against the United 
States." The President's traditional executive power to defend 
the Nation against sudden or imminent prospective attack would 
appear to cover such cases, but not clearly or absolutely so. The 
more such presidential "action" to "deter and prevent" terrorism 
tends to become pre-emptive and anticipatory; and the more it 
involves offensive use of military force within the territory of 
and against the forces of other nations for a sustained period of 
time, the more strongly it also would appear to fall within Con-
gress's constitutional power "to declare War." At the same time, 
in most imaginable real-world instances of presidential military 
action to deter and prevent international terrorism against the 
United States it is genuinely hard to say that constitutional au-
thority to act lies exclusively within the province of Congress's 
power to declare war, such that Congress's and the President's 
agreed understanding is contrary to a fixed rule of law supplied 
by the Constitution. Across a broad range of circumstances, 
Congress's interpretation of the Constitution in support of presi-
dential constitutional power -its view, enacted as part of the 9-
18-01 Resolution that "the President has authority under the 
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of interna-
tional terrorism against the United States" -is a legitimate and 
constitutionally proper one. 
109. See note 104. 
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When taken together with the broad "Category I" authori-
zation for use of force, this expansive congressional "Category I 
lh'' interpretation of presidential constitutional power answers 
most separation-of-powers legal questions concerning war au-
thority directed against terrorism, for the indefinite future. As 
this article goes to print, one of the important issues of the cur-
rent war is whether the President already possesses legal author-
ity to take military action against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. 110 
Under the 9-18-01 Resolution, it probably would not be difficult 
for the President to determine that offensive military action 
against Iraq is justified under the 9-18-01 Resolution, either be-
cause of a sufficient "aiding" or "harboring" connection between 
the present Iraqi regime and persons, groups, or nations who 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 (under section 2(a)'s specific authorization), or be-
cause the President deems such action necessary "to deter and 
prevent" future acts of terrorism (under the last "whereas" 
clause) because of evidence of development or attempted devel-
opment of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and evidence 
of an intention to facilitate terrorist attacks against the United 
States involving such weapons. 
In short, under the legal paradigm within which we now op-
erate, President George W. Bush appears to possess full consti-
tutional authority to take whatever "action" he deems necessary, 
including (but not necessarily limited to) the use of military 
force, against Iraq and Saddam Hussein-or against any other 
nation, organization, or person that he determines poses a le-
gitimate threat of terrorism directed against the United States. 
Such authority is explicit ("Category I") in the case of nations, 
organizations, and persons involved in some way, direct or indi-
rect, in the September 11 attacks. Such authority is implicit 
("Category II" or "Category I lh'') in the case of nations, organi-
zations, and persons not involved in the September 11 attacks 
but posing a demonstrable risk of terrorism directed against the 
United States, by virtue of the agreed constitutional interpreta-
tions of the President and Congress concerning presidential con-
II 0. Congress recently passed further, specific authority for the President to use 
military force against Iraq. Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-
llon of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (Oct. 16, 2002). The implications of this 
sweeping authorization are an important topic in their own right, but must await another 
day. 
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stitutional authority to act affirmatively to deter and prevent fu-
ture terrorist aggression.''' 
Such congressional endorsement of presidential authority 
would appear to extend beyond use of military force. The last 
whereas clause of the 9-18-01 Resolution speaks broadly of the 
President's constitutional power to "take action." This could 
fairly be understood to include such things as covert actions, 
economic measures, and even authority to "try" and punish in-
ternational terrorists for "crimes" under the rubric of the war 
power rather than the domestic criminal justice system. Thus, 
for example, insofar as President Bush's November 13, 2001 Or-
der authorizing the establishment of military commissions might 
111. Section 2(b)(2) of the 9-18-01 Resolution states that "[n]othing in this resolu-
tion supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." Might this provision 
be understood to negate Congress's endorsement of independent presidential constitu-
tional power to act against terrorism in the final "whereas" clause? Almost certainly not: 
Nothing in the 9·18-01 Resolution, including the final "whereas" clause, is inconsistent 
with anything that the War Powers Resolution purports to require. Section 1541 of the 
WPR describes Congress's constitutional interpretation of the President's Commander-
in-Chief clause powers, but does not purport to impose any statutory "requirement." It 
states the constitutional interpretation on which the requirements of subsequent sections 
are based. The 9-18-01 Resolution appears to supplement and expand upon the WPR's 
constitutional interpretation, but it does not purport to supersede any of the WPR's ac-
tual "requirement[s]". 
Section 1544 of the WPR purports to state actual "requirements," but, as argued 
above, those provisions are constitutionally valid and operative only where the President 
is acting beyond the scope of his constitutional power-begging the whole question at 
issue: Does the President have constitutional power to act, in this zone of uncertainty, 
where Congress in the 9-18-01 Resolution has adopted a broad construction of independ-
ent presidential power? To the extent section S's provisions are properly viewed as a 
"safe harbor" within which presidential action is deemed consistent with Congress's in-
terpretation of the scope of the President's independent constitutional power, the 9-18-01 
Resolution's endorsement of broad presidential power to combat terrorism does not ap-
pear to supersede a requirement of the War Powers Resolution. It merely modifies Con-
gress's present constitutional interpretation of the scope of independent presidential 
power. 
Another legitimate interpretive issue is whether such a broad reading of the 9-18-01 
Resolution's final "whereas" clause contradicts the interpretive canon of section 1547(a) 
of the War Powers Resolution itself. Section 1547(a) states that "[a]uthority to introduce 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... shall not be inferred (1) from any provi-
sion of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolu-
tion) ... unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to con-
stitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution." 50 
U.S.C. § 1547(a). The short answer is that the 9-18-01 Resolution's "whereas" clause 
does not purport to constitute statutory authorization for the President to act; it is techni-
cally not part of the substantive enactment conferring presidential authority. Rather, the 
clause is a congressional interpretation of the President's constitutional powers. While the 
WPR's interpretive canon probably forecloses reading the 9-18-01 "whereas" provision 
as conferring statutory authority, nothing in the WPR forecloses Congress from modify-
ing, and later expressing, its constitutional interpretations of the scope of legitimate in-
dependent presidential power. 
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be thought to pose separation-of-powers issues of presidential 
versus congressional authority (as opposed to issues arising un-
der the Fifth or Sixth amendments), the 9-18-01 Resolution ap-
pears to resolve them in favor of presidential authority. 112 
None of this is meant to constitute a normative judgment of 
the wisdom of such a broad grant-plus-concession of presidential 
war power. I mean only to describe what I believe is a dramatic, 
watershed constitutional enactment with respect to the constitu-
tional allocation of the power to wage war, and how it fits within 
the paradigms of Youngstown Sheet & Tube. There are argu-
ments strongly in favor of such an assignment of power to the 
executive-the traditional arguments of unity, secrecy, initiative, 
and dispatch in the conduct of foreign affairs and military opera-
tions. There are also arguments against such an assignment, in-
cluding the difficulty of revoking such power once granted, the 
broad terms in which the power is granted, and its indefinite du-
ration. Whether Congress may one day regret having written 
the Presidency so blank a check is a question for history. But the 
existence of the blank check is, for now, a fact of law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube has proven a remarkably durable 
decision providing durable paradigms for interpreting the Con-
stitution's allocations of power between Congress and the Presi-
dent in the areas of foreign affairs, war powers, and domestice 
legislative authority. The holding of Youngstown is of enduring 
significance: the President's executive and Commander-in-Chief 
powers do not entail a unilateral presidential legislative power in 
time of war, and the Constitution is a self-executing prohibition 
of presidential usurpation of such power enforceable by the judi-
ciary. The success of the Youngstown Court in enforcing this 
principle fifty years ago, at a crucial point in our nation's history, 
has been vital to the endurance of freedom in the United States 
for half a century. 
112. The November 13, 2001 Order cites the 9-18-01 Resolution as part of the legal 
authority for the order authorizing military commissions. See 66 Fed. Reg. 57833. For 
an argument against the validity of the November 13,2001 Order, see Neal K. Katyal and 
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale 
L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that President Bush's order lacks adequate 
congressional authorization). For a persuasive response to this particular argument, see 
Bradley and Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 Green 
Bag at 249 (cited in note 21). 
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Moreover, the analysis of Youngstown offers enduring 
paradigms of constitutional interpretation for a text whose gen-
ius with respect to allocation of the war power in particular is 
that it answers some questions clearly and leaves the resolution 
of others uncertain, to be answered perhaps differently by dif-
ferent generations, as a function of the interaction of the views 
of different branches armed with different aspects of a divided 
power. Youngstown, as applied to the war power, reinforces the 
conclusion that the President's executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers do not entail a unilateral presidential constitu-
tional power to initiate war. Rather, the war power is divided 
between Congress and the President, with a good many of its 
applications falling within a zone of twilight in which the 
branches have concurrent authority, the precise distribution of 
which is uncertain. In such cases, the constitutional interpreta-
tions of Congress and the President properly make a difference 
as to the degree to which the Constitution may be thought to 
pose a restriction on presidential action. 
This, too, is a formula for enduring freedom. It preserves 
flexibility for presidential action in times of crisis, but does so 
without stating a rule of plenary presidential emergency power. 
It permits the President to exercise great power in defense of the 
nation. As the framers understood, there are times when the 
ability of the government to exercise great power can be as vital 
to freedom as the existence of restrictions on such power.113 At 
the same time, the formula withholds clarity and certainty from 
the President's assertion of power where Congress has declined 
to supply it. And it leaves presidential action of yet more doubt-
ful constitutional legitimacy where Congress has by authoritative 
legislative action-the passing of statutes-staked out a constitu-
tional position against that of the President. 
All of this is as it should be. Those who claim plenary, uni-
lateral presidential war power do not have the support of the 
Constitution. Those who claim entire congressional power over 
the President in matters of national defense and the use of mili-
tary force do not have the support of the Constitution either. 
The Constitution of War is, like the Constitution in other impor-
113. Federalist 1 (Hamilton) 4 (cited in note 52) ("(T}he noble enthusiasm of liberty 
is too apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, 
it will be equally forgotton, that the vigour of government is essential to the security of 
liberty(.]); Federalist 23 (Hamilton) 111, 112 (cited in note 52) (defending position that 
"there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and pro-
tection of the community in any matter essential to its efficary"). 
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tant respects, one of division, separation, and blending of-and 
thus competition over-power. 
